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Abstract: 
Conceptual replications offer robust tests of theory by subjecting the relational notions of a scientific model 
to evaluation using alternate instruments, treatments, and subject pools. This study performs a conceptual 
replication of Moody, Siponen, and Pahnila’s 2018 empirical analysis that integrated elements of eleven 
theoretical models to produce the unified model of information security policy compliance (UMISPC). This 
replication employed a substantially more parsimonious instrument, using modestly revised treatment 
scenarios targeted toward a U.S. audience of 218 IT professionals as opposed to the Finnish graduate 
students used in the original study. Our results indicate that UMISPC is robust across variations in 
instruments and subject pools. The replicated model explained approximately two thirds of the variance in 
information systems security policy compliance intentions across both studies. In contrast, competing 
models such as the theory of planned behavior and extended protection motivation theory exhibited large 
changes in explanatory power when the instrument and subject pool were modified. This suggests that 
UMIPSC may be a superior theoretical model for consistently evaluating security policy compliance 
behavioral intentions among varied populations. Our results also indicate that the theoretical model is 
capable of detecting and integrating a wide range of behavioral antecedents that may have differing levels 
of influence among various populations. 
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1 Introduction 
Numerous researchers have sought to identify factors that motivate employees to comply with information 
security policies (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Herath & Rao, 2009; Moody et al., 2018; Schneier, 2011; Siponen 
& Baskerville, 2018).  Between 2009 and 2019, over 4,700 articles discussing the topic were published and 
of those 143 focused specifically on factors that affect employees’ compliance behavior1.  However, the 
individual articles were based on a wide range of theoretical perspectives from disciplines including 
criminology, psychology, social psychology, and health.  As Moody, Siponen, and Pahnila (2018) noted, this 
has resulted “in a jungle of competing behavioral models that may not be easily compared” (p. 286) and 
does little to clarify the field’s collective understanding of security policy compliance behavior.   
Conceptual replications provide a robust method for testing the bounds of applicability for previously 
validated theoretical models. Such replications can determine whether the theoretical underpinnings of a 
model will hold in varied experimental conditions such as altered instrumentation and variations in the 
subject pool. In the current study, we test the (Moody et al., 2018) unified model of information security 
policy compliance (UMISPC) to determines its applicability to information technology (IT) professionals. 
Previous research suggests that information security professionals evaluate security risks differently than 
other groups of organizational insiders (Posey et al., 2014). More specifically, technology experts tend to 
make probabilistic security risk determinations while lay persons tend to be influenced by emotional 
reactions to threats and their potential impacts (Peters et al., 2006; Ponemon, 2014). Additionally, while lay 
people may be less informed regarding substantive risk issues, they tend to consider a much wider array of 
risk factors than IT professionals (Posey et al., 2014). Finally, IT professionals tend to have higher self-
efficacy than lay persons with regard to their ability to appropriately respond to IT security threats.  
Moody et al.’s (2018) original study examined UMISPC via a sample of Finnish graduate students which 
approximated the population of lay people within organizations. Our study considered the model’s 
applicability to IT professionals who are expected to have differing underlying motivations based on their 
greater understanding of risk factors, higher self-efficacy, and reduced reliance on emotional reactions 
during risk calculations. 
Moody et al. (2018) identified 11 information security policy compliance models that have been widely 
discussed in the literature including:  1) the theory of neutralization, 2) the health belief model, 3) the theory 
of reasoned action, 4) protection motivation theory, 5) theory of interpersonal behavior (TIB), 6) deterrence 
theory and rational choice theory, 7) extended protection motivation theory (EPMT), 8) theory of planned 
behavior, 9) theory of self-regulation, 10) extended parallel processing model, and 11) control balance 
theory.  They then conducted a multi-phase examination of the eleven models to develop UMISPC, which 
includes components of the other models.  The authors then empirically tested UMISPC using responses 
from Finnish graduate students (Figure 1). 
Moody et al. (2018) later reduced the model by eliminating non-significant paths (rewards/costs, 
punishment, habit). However, in our replication, we tested Moody et al.’s full UMISPC model (Figure 1) along 
with the TIB and EPMT models, which also exhibit strong results in Moody et al.’s study.   
 
1 Google Scholar advanced search of articles containing the phrase “security policy compliance” in the title on 8/21/2019.  Patents and 
citations excluded. 
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Figure 1:  UMISPC Results (Moody et al. 2018) 
 
2  Methods 
The purpose of our study was to replicate Moody et al.’s (2018) UMISPC findings with a different target 
population and more parsimonious measures in order to assess the model’s fit and explanatory power 
relative to the EPMT and TIB models.  We focused our comparison on EPMT and TIB as they provided the 
first- and second-best explanations of security policy compliance intentions in the first phase of Moody et 
al.’s study.  Additionally, TIB provided the foundational basis for UMISPC.  Accordingly, we believe it is 
important to see if UMISPC provides better fit and explanatory value than EMPT and TIB in a different 
context.  We chose not to compare the UMISPC model to the other nine models Moody et al. examined due 
to concerns regarding the length of the required survey instrument.   
For the study we employed an electronic survey to collect the data and used the R package, PLSPM, to 
analyze the data.  PLSPM has been widely used in IS research and has been noted as an appropriate tool 
for both confirmatory and explanatory research (Benitez et al., 2019; McIntosh et al., 2014).  The following 
sections outline the steps involved in our research process. 
 
2.1 Data Collection  
We contracted with Qualtrics Sampling Services to collect a minimum of 210 responses from IT 
professionals.  We chose that sample size as power analysis indicated that 134 responses were needed to 
detect a medium effect size in a regression equation containing six independent variables at the 0.05 error 
probability and 0.80 power levels. 
Qualtrics aggregates online panel resources and distributes survey dashboards in which respondents can 
see all surveys that they qualified for.  Once a respondent clicks on a survey they are interested in learning 
more about, Qualtrics begins tracking them.  In total, 597 clicked on our survey.  Of those 220 responses 
were complete and usable for analysis, which is a 37% completion rate.    
When starting the survey, respondents were first asked to confirm that they were an IT professional.  Those 
who responded affirmatively were shown a list of 18 IT occupations and asked to select the one that was 
most similar to their current position.  The list of occupations was drawn from the United States Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Occupational Handbook (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015) and included options like 
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Business Intelligence Analyst, Database Administrator, Systems Administrator as well as an Other option, 
which required entry of the respondent’s occupation in an associated textbox.  At a later point in the survey, 
respondents were asked to also enter their current job title.   
To validate that all respondents were indeed IT professionals, we compared each respondent’s occupational 
selection to their entered job title.  Two respondents were eliminated from the sample, as the titles they 
entered were not related to their chosen occupation, leaving 218 responses for analysis.  The breakdown 
of the occupations represented in the sample is shown in Figure 2.  As can be seen, slightly over 60% of 
the respondents identified as either an IT project management professional or a computer/IS manager.  
Seventeen respondents did not choose from the pre-defined list of occupations and selected the “other” 
option.  We visually inspected the occupations entered by those individuals to ensure that they were actually 
IT related.  All were judged to be valid and included occupations like IT consultant, IT auditor, CIO, and 
Business Owner.   
 
 
Figure 2:  Count of Respondent Occupations 
 
After the occupation validation step, each respondent was assigned to one of three scenarios, which were 
drawn from Moody et al. (2018) with updates made to change the scenario subject’s name from Mattila to 
Chris.  In addition, changes were made to instill consistency across the three scenarios regarding Chris’s 
managerial level and length of employment.  Finally, statements were added to emphasize Chris’s 
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perceptions regarding the need to act promptly to meet an important deadline.  Minor wording changes were 
also made to enhance readability of the three scenarios.  The full text of each scenario can be found in 
Appendix A.    
 
2.2 Measures 
We modeled our instrument after Moody et al.’s (2018) instrument but reduced both the number of 
constructs assessed and the number of items used to measure each construct in an effort to create a 
shorter, more usable survey.  Moody et al.’s full instrument contained 126 items with many constructs 
measured using five or more items.  For example, habit was assessed using 12 items; response cost was 
assessed using 7 items; and fear was assessed using 11 items.  At the outset of the study, we were highly 
concerned about the length of the Moody et al. instrument, the impact of survey fatigue on response rate, 
and IT professionals’ tolerance toward completing such a long instrument.  Accordingly, we designed our 
instrument to only include items to assess the constructs included in the TIB, EPMT, and UMISCP models.  
Additionally, we reduced the number of items for each construct by referring to Moody et al.’s (2018) factor 
analysis output and selecting the three items with highest loadings for each construct.  In the case of Moody 
et al.’s threat construct, the three highest loading items were equivalent to the three items used to assess 
susceptibility in the EMPT model.  In the case of reactance and intention, Moody et al. used two item 
measures that both exhibited strong reliability and validity, so we retained those two items.  Our final 
instrument contained 55 items to assess the constructs included in the three models.   
In the text of the items, all references to the scenario subject were changed from Mattila, a Finnish name, 
to Chris, a gender-neutral English name.  Several items were modified to make the statements shorter and 
more colloquial in English as the original instrument was administered in Finnish.  Across all items, the term 
“would” was updated to either “could” or “would likely”.  We felt this change was needed to ensure that the 
collected response was for the underlying construct rather than the probability that a threat would occur.  
For example, one of Moody et al.’s severity items stated, “If I were to do what Mattila did, there would be a 
serious information security problem for my organization.” As “would” can be interpreted as certainty, it is 
possible that some individuals might respond to that question regarding the likelihood of a problem occurring 
rather than regarding the severity of a such problem.  Accordingly, we believe the terms “could” and “would 
likely” lessened the degree of perceived certainty and will help subjects focus on the underlying construct 
to be measured.   
Three new items were developed for the social factor constructs as none of the items used by Moody et al. 
(2018) loaded significantly on any of the identified factors.  Additionally, items to assess the fear construct 
were updated to focus on “company computers” rather than “my computer”.  We felt this update was needed 
as information security policies are designed to protect all organizational computers not just the individual 
referenced in the scenario.  The full list of items included on our electronic survey instrument can be found 
in Appendix B.  The instrument was pilot tested using a sample of 180 Amazon Turk workers.  Analysis of 
the pilot sample data indicated that the revised instrument exhibited adequate reliability and validity.   
3 Results 
The following sections outline the results of our analyses relating to the measurement and path models 
employed in the replication study.   
3.1 Measurement Model  
As our instrument contained items to assess three different theoretical models each containing different 
combinations of constructs, we began by constructing a composite model where all items were modeled as 
reflective indicators of the theorized construct.  Several iterations of that model were tested with incremental 
removal of poorly loading indicators.  During this process the following items were removed due to loading 
below 0.50 on the theorized construct:  punishment1, social factors1, severity1, susceptibility1, response 
efficacy2, and fear1.  Next, we assessed the reliability of the constructs.  As can be seen in Table 1, most 
of the constructs exceeded the accepted 0.70 Cronbach’s Alpha reliability threshold.  Habit and severity 
were just under the threshold, whereas response efficacy, social factors, and susceptibility were each 
approximately 10 points below the threshold.  However, the Dillon-Goldstein’s composite reliability rho index 
for all of the constructs exceed 0.80.  
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Table 1:  Construct Reliability 
  
Num of 
Items  
Cronbach 
Alpha 
DG 
Rho 
Affect 3 0.948 0.967 
Attitude 3 0.964 0.977 
Fac_Conditions 2 0.912 0.958 
Fear 2 0.721 0.878 
Habit 3 0.683 0.826 
Intention 2 0.964 0.982 
Neutralization 3 0.950 0.968 
Punishment 2 0.753 0.890 
Reactance 3 0.891 0.932 
Resp_Cost 3 0.821 0.893 
Response_Efficacy 2 0.595 0.831 
Rewards 3 0.879 0.925 
Roles 3 0.958 0.973 
Self_Concept 3 0.775 0.870 
Severity 2 0.682 0.863 
Social_Factors 2 0.603 0.834 
Subj_Norms 3 0.964 0.976 
Susceptibility 2 0.606 0.835 
 
Vinzi (2010) notes that a block of items is considered homogeneous if the rho index is greater than 0.70.  
Further, Chin (1998) notes that Dillon-Goldstein’s rho is a superior reliability measure as it is based on item 
loadings rather than the correlations between the manifest variables.  As we collected the data with a highly 
parsimonious instrument, we felt the scales exhibited an adequate level of reliability to move forward with 
our analysis.   
Next, we calculated correlations for each of the measured constructs.  As PLSPM is based on standardized 
measures, the means and standard deviations are not shown in the Table 2.   
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Table 2:  Correlations and Square Roots of AVE 
   
An assessment of convergent validity was completed by examining the on-factor loadings for each indicator 
to ensure they were at or above 0.70 for the intended construct (Gefen et al., 2011).  This was achieved for 
all constructs, except habit (Table 3). We tested all combinations of items in hopes of finding a measurement 
solution that included at least two indicators loading close to or above 0.70.  
However, no combination of the three items results in that outcome.  Accordingly, we chose to retain all 
three items in our model and offer caution when interpreted results involving that construct.   
An additional difference we found in our data from Moody et al.’s (2018) results concerned the rewards/costs 
construct. When Moody et al. conducted principle factor analysis on all items included in the 11 models they 
tested, items from the TIB rewards and response cost constructs all loaded on a single factor that they 
named reward/costs.  In our analysis, however, the three reward items loaded together on one factor and 
the response cost items loaded strongly together on another factor.  Accordingly, we modeled reward and 
response cost as two separate constructs in our analysis.    
 
Rew Pun Att Snor Rol Scon Sfac Affe Seve Susc Reffi FearFcon Rcos Neu Hab Rea Int
Rew 0.90
Pun 0.16 0.86
Att 0.65 0.17 0.97
Snor 0.63 0.19 0.80 0.97
Rol 0.67 0.15 0.82 0.87 0.96
Scon 0.04 0.32 -0.09 -0.07 -0.09 0.83
Sfac 0.24 0.62 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.32 0.85
Affe 0.63 0.13 0.93 0.76 0.77 -0.14 0.17 0.95
Seve 0.08 0.43 0.10 0.16 0.11 0.29 0.28 0.08 0.86
Susc 0.01 0.42 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 0.55 0.38 -0.15 0.41 0.84
Reffi -0.05 0.35 -0.10 -0.16 -0.14 0.51 0.40 -0.10 0.29 0.63 0.84
Fear 0.34 0.37 0.45 0.49 0.46 0.27 0.38 0.43 0.34 0.24 0.20 0.88
Fcon 0.56 0.21 0.67 0.80 0.73 0.08 0.25 0.67 0.14 -0.06 -0.07 0.51 0.96
Rcos 0.62 0.24 0.51 0.56 0.59 0.13 0.25 0.52 0.33 0.08 0.11 0.36 0.51 0.86
Neu 0.63 0.15 0.79 0.83 0.84 0.07 0.19 0.75 0.16 -0.02 -0.04 0.57 0.72 0.59 0.95
Hab 0.00 0.18 -0.14 -0.12 -0.11 0.21 0.13 -0.16 0.13 0.23 0.17 0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.13 0.49
Rea 0.49 0.11 0.67 0.57 0.62 -0.01 0.16 0.66 0.02 -0.08 -0.05 0.38 0.48 0.40 0.64 -0.06 0.91
Int 0.66 0.15 0.79 0.89 0.83 -0.05 0.19 0.73 0.15 -0.10 -0.10 0.50 0.76 0.57 0.82 -0.13 0.56 0.98
Diagonal elements represent the square root of AVE for each construct
Rew = Rewards, Pun = Punishment, Att = Attitude, Snor = Subjective Norms, Rol = Roles, Scon = Self Concept
Sfac = Social Factors, Aff = Affect, Seve = Severity, Susc = Susceptibility, Reffi = Response Efficacy, Fear = Fear,
Fcon = Facilitating Conditions, Rcos = Response Cost, Neu = Nuetralization, Hab = Habit, Rea = Reactance, 
Int = Intention 
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Table 3:  Factor Loadings 
  
To assess the discriminant validity of our measures, we reviewed the cross loadings for each item.  While 
we did find high cross loadings for some constructs, such as those for affect and attitudes, these must be 
evaluated with the theorized relationships between those constructs in mind.  Affect has been widely 
discussed as a determinant of attitude (Clore & Schnall, 2005).  Accordingly, we did not consider high cross 
loadings between those constructs to be problematic.  To further substantiate the discriminant validity of the 
scales, the square root of the average variance extracted (AVE) was calculated for each construct to ensure 
that the value was greater than the construct’s correlations with all other constructs.  As the diagonal 
elements in Table 2 show, each construct’s square root of AVE exceeds its correlations with all other 
constructs.  
Item Rew Pun Att Snor Rol Scon Sfac Affe Seve Susc Reffi Fear Fcon Rcos Neu Hab Rea Int
Rew1 0.92 0.06 0.57 0.58 0.60 0.01 0.18 0.56 0.03 -0.05 -0.08 0.31 0.51 0.57 0.56 -0.03 0.41 0.62
Rew2 0.91 0.22 0.56 0.57 0.61 -0.02 0.25 0.55 0.10 0.01 -0.08 0.30 0.49 0.57 0.58 0.03 0.42 0.58
Rew3 0.87 0.14 0.61 0.56 0.60 0.10 0.21 0.57 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.31 0.51 0.54 0.56 0.00 0.48 0.56
Pun2 0.08 0.71 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.35 0.51 0.03 0.41 0.44 0.38 0.31 0.10 0.17 0.06 0.18 0.05 0.04
Pun3 0.16 0.99 0.18 0.21 0.16 0.29 0.60 0.14 0.40 0.38 0.33 0.36 0.21 0.24 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.16
Att1 0.61 0.17 0.95 0.75 0.76 -0.05 0.20 0.88 0.12 -0.09 -0.05 0.43 0.62 0.48 0.74 -0.16 0.62 0.74
Att2 0.64 0.16 0.98 0.78 0.81 -0.10 0.16 0.90 0.06 -0.13 -0.10 0.44 0.65 0.49 0.79 -0.15 0.67 0.78
Att3 0.63 0.16 0.97 0.79 0.80 -0.11 0.17 0.91 0.10 -0.14 -0.12 0.44 0.68 0.51 0.77 -0.11 0.64 0.77
Snor1 0.60 0.20 0.76 0.96 0.82 -0.10 0.20 0.71 0.14 -0.12 -0.17 0.45 0.76 0.54 0.79 -0.08 0.53 0.85
Snor2 0.62 0.18 0.76 0.97 0.85 -0.06 0.23 0.73 0.15 -0.10 -0.17 0.49 0.79 0.55 0.80 -0.14 0.54 0.87
Snor3 0.62 0.17 0.80 0.96 0.86 -0.04 0.19 0.75 0.17 -0.12 -0.15 0.48 0.78 0.54 0.80 -0.12 0.58 0.87
Rol1 0.66 0.20 0.77 0.83 0.96 -0.06 0.19 0.72 0.11 -0.10 -0.12 0.43 0.71 0.54 0.78 -0.04 0.55 0.78
Rol2 0.64 0.11 0.79 0.83 0.97 -0.11 0.14 0.76 0.11 -0.13 -0.13 0.45 0.69 0.60 0.81 -0.13 0.60 0.80
Rol3 0.62 0.13 0.80 0.85 0.95 -0.10 0.15 0.76 0.10 -0.14 -0.17 0.44 0.70 0.55 0.82 -0.15 0.63 0.81
Scon1 0.08 0.35 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.72 0.27 -0.02 0.27 0.33 0.35 0.34 0.21 0.22 0.14 0.18 0.05 0.07
Scon2 0.08 0.25 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 0.85 0.26 -0.10 0.21 0.53 0.42 0.25 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.24 0.03 -0.03
Scon3 -0.03 0.24 -0.13 -0.12 -0.15 0.90 0.28 -0.18 0.25 0.48 0.47 0.16 -0.01 0.10 0.01 0.12 -0.06 -0.11
Sfac2 0.19 0.53 0.14 0.17 0.10 0.33 0.86 0.11 0.20 0.30 0.31 0.36 0.22 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.18
Sfac3 0.22 0.51 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.83 0.18 0.27 0.34 0.36 0.28 0.20 0.29 0.17 0.08 0.12 0.13
Affe1 0.64 0.15 0.93 0.78 0.79 -0.14 0.17 0.95 0.06 -0.15 -0.12 0.45 0.68 0.50 0.76 -0.13 0.67 0.75
Affe2 0.58 0.09 0.84 0.67 0.69 -0.12 0.16 0.94 0.09 -0.13 -0.06 0.39 0.60 0.48 0.67 -0.15 0.60 0.64
Aff3 0.57 0.13 0.87 0.70 0.72 -0.13 0.15 0.96 0.09 -0.14 -0.09 0.40 0.62 0.49 0.69 -0.17 0.62 0.67
Seve2 0.07 0.36 0.11 0.16 0.14 0.22 0.20 0.10 0.96 0.32 0.21 0.31 0.14 0.33 0.16 0.07 0.03 0.15
Seve3 0.05 0.43 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.35 0.36 0.02 0.74 0.47 0.37 0.29 0.10 0.21 0.10 0.24 0.01 0.09
Susc2 0.02 0.35 -0.10 -0.11 -0.12 0.44 0.31 -0.13 0.40 0.91 0.49 0.19 -0.06 0.08 -0.02 0.15 -0.10 -0.07
Susc3 -0.02 0.37 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 0.51 0.34 -0.13 0.27 0.78 0.61 0.24 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.26 -0.02 -0.10
Reffi1 -0.06 0.34 -0.07 -0.12 -0.10 0.30 0.33 -0.04 0.29 0.48 0.75 0.16 -0.09 0.05 -0.07 0.27 -0.06 -0.06
Reffi3 -0.03 0.28 -0.09 -0.15 -0.14 0.51 0.35 -0.11 0.22 0.58 0.92 0.18 -0.05 0.12 -0.01 0.07 -0.03 -0.10
Fear2 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.36 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.25 0.82 0.34 0.30 0.44 0.02 0.30 0.32
Fear3 0.31 0.36 0.46 0.52 0.48 0.21 0.32 0.43 0.31 0.14 0.14 0.93 0.53 0.33 0.55 0.12 0.36 0.52
Fcon2 0.55 0.23 0.66 0.78 0.72 0.07 0.28 0.67 0.14 -0.07 -0.05 0.51 0.96 0.52 0.72 -0.11 0.49 0.73
Fcon3 0.52 0.17 0.63 0.76 0.68 0.09 0.19 0.61 0.14 -0.05 -0.10 0.48 0.96 0.45 0.67 -0.07 0.43 0.73
Rcos1 0.58 0.19 0.46 0.53 0.56 0.10 0.22 0.48 0.27 0.04 0.07 0.40 0.48 0.90 0.57 -0.14 0.39 0.58
Rcos2 0.56 0.26 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.10 0.26 0.47 0.26 0.10 0.13 0.24 0.38 0.82 0.44 -0.05 0.30 0.45
Rcos3 0.47 0.17 0.38 0.45 0.47 0.16 0.17 0.37 0.32 0.08 0.10 0.26 0.43 0.85 0.49 -0.05 0.34 0.43
Neu1 0.54 0.12 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.11 0.17 0.66 0.11 -0.02 -0.01 0.50 0.61 0.49 0.93 -0.13 0.59 0.72
Neu2 0.63 0.13 0.77 0.82 0.83 0.02 0.18 0.73 0.17 -0.02 -0.05 0.55 0.72 0.60 0.96 -0.14 0.61 0.82
Neu3 0.63 0.17 0.78 0.82 0.82 0.09 0.20 0.75 0.17 -0.02 -0.06 0.58 0.73 0.58 0.97 -0.10 0.62 0.81
Hab1 0.06 0.33 -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 0.35 0.33 -0.12 0.27 0.44 0.40 0.15 -0.06 0.03 -0.12 0.84 -0.10 -0.09
Hab2 0.10 0.28 0.11 -0.03 -0.04 0.12 0.33 0.08 0.24 0.29 0.34 0.04 -0.05 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.00
Hab3 0.12 0.32 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.31 0.40 0.03 0.28 0.43 0.47 0.13 0.04 0.21 -0.01 -0.08 -0.08 0.05
Rea1 0.46 0.11 0.60 0.49 0.54 0.01 0.16 0.62 0.05 -0.11 -0.03 0.32 0.44 0.34 0.55 0.00 0.90 0.48
Rea2 0.42 0.09 0.56 0.48 0.51 0.02 0.13 0.55 0.03 -0.06 -0.03 0.34 0.40 0.37 0.56 -0.09 0.92 0.48
Rea3 0.45 0.10 0.64 0.57 0.62 -0.05 0.14 0.63 -0.01 -0.05 -0.07 0.38 0.46 0.38 0.62 -0.09 0.90 0.56
Int1 0.65 0.16 0.80 0.88 0.81 -0.02 0.20 0.73 0.15 -0.08 -0.09 0.50 0.76 0.56 0.81 -0.14 0.56 0.98
Int2 0.64 0.13 0.76 0.88 0.82 -0.08 0.16 0.70 0.14 -0.12 -0.11 0.48 0.73 0.57 0.80 -0.12 0.55 0.98
Factors
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Finally, we employed Harman’s (1976) single latent factor technique to ensure that common method bias 
did not unduly impact our measurement model.  Each of the three models included in our study fit the data 
better than a model with a single factor.  Accordingly, we did not find evidence that common method variance 
biased the sample.  We do note that Harman’s single factor technique has recently been questioned and 
reported as insensitive and incomplete (Tehseen et al., 2017). 
3.2 Path Models  
We used PLSPM with 500 bootstrap resamples to test path models for each theory – TIB, EPMT, and 
UMISPC.  Figure 3 shows the results of the TIB model.   
 
 
Figure 3:  Theory of Interpersonal Behavior (TIB) Results 
 
In the TIB model, rewards (β = 0.54, p < .001) and response cost (β = 0.17, p < .001) significantly influenced 
attitude explaining 44% of the attitude variance. Subjective norm (β = 0.25, p < .10) and roles (β = -0.02, p 
> .10) were not significantly associated with social factors, but self-concept (β = 0.33, p < .001) was 
significant, generating an R2 of .16 for social factors. Attitude (β = 0.68, p < .001) significantly affected 
intention as did affect (β = 0.20, p < .05). Social factors (β = -0.01, p > .10) were not influential on intention. 
Overall, the R2 value for intention was very good at .73 with facilitating conditions (β = 0.43, p < .001) 
significantly associated but not habit (β = -0.03, p > .10). 
Next, we used PLSPM with 500 bootstrap resamples to test path models for EPMT (Figure 4).  Of all the 
antecedents to intention in the EPMT model, response cost (β = 0.46, p < .001), rewards (β = 0.26, p < .001) 
and susceptibility (β = -0.15, p < .05) were significant. Severity (β = 0.06, p > .10), response efficacy (β = -
0.06, p > .10) and self-efficacy (β = 0.10, p > .10) were not significant. Path values for costs and rewards 
were much larger than the other four variables. Severity, susceptibility, response efficacy and self-efficacy 
had relatively small path values and the R2 value for the EPMT model was less than the TIB model at .50. 
Figure 3 details the results for the EPMT model. 
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Figure 4:  Extended Protection Motivation Theory (EPMT) Results 
 
The UMISPC was the final model evaluated. Variables included facilitating conditions, response costs, 
rewards, punishments, social factors, fear, response efficacy, threat, neutralization, habit, reactance and 
intention. Figure 5 shows the results of the PLSPM analysis of UMISPC.  Response efficacy (β = 0.65, p < 
.001) significantly affected threat (β = 0.36, p < .001), which in turn impacted fear significantly. Significant 
antecedents to intention included facilitating conditions (β = 0.48, p < .001), response costs (β = 0.13, p < 
.01), rewards (β = 0.28, p < .001) and fear (β = 0.14, p < .01). 
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Figure 5:  Unified Model of Information Security Policy Compliance (UMISPC) Results 
 
Habit (β = -0.08, p < .10) was only marginally significant in its relationship with intention and insignificant 
with reactance. Neutralization (β = 0.60, p < .001) significantly influenced reactance. 
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Table 4:  Summary of Fit and Explanatory Value of Tested Theories 
Model Relation Moody et al. Result Replication Result 
E
P
M
T
  
Severity → Intention -0.07  0.06 
Susceptibility → Intention -0.12* -0.15* 
Response Efficacy → Intention -0.04 -0.06 
Self-efficacy → Intention -0.72***  0.10 
Reward → Intention  0.24**  0.46*** 
Costs → Intention  -0.05  0.26*** 
Intention R2 60% 50% 
Model Fit  CFI = 0.81, TLI = 0.79 GoF = 0.62 
T
IB
 
Rewards → Attitude  0.30***  0.54*** 
Penalties → Attitude -0.29***  0.17*** 
Subjective Norms → Social Factors  0.29***  0.25+  
Roles → Social Factors  0.19**  0.02 
Self-Concept → Social Factors -0.20***  0.33*** 
Attitude → Intention  0.26***  0.68*** 
Affect → Intention  0.36***  0.20* 
Social Factors → Intention  0.62*** -0.01 
Facilitating Conditions → Intention  0.11**  0.43*** 
Habit → Intention -0.04 -0.03 
Intention R2 59% 73% 
Model Fit  CFI = 0.72, TLI = 0.80 GoF = 0.59 
U
M
IS
P
C
 
Response Efficacy → Threat  0.33***  0.65*** 
Threat→ Fear  0.59***  0.36*** 
Facilitating Conditions → Intention  0.04  0.48*** 
Rewards/Costs → Intention  0.13   
Response Costs → Intention    0.13* 
Rewards → Intention    0.28*** 
Punishment → Intention  0.39  0.02 
Social Factors → Intention  0.77*** -0.04 
Fear → Intention -0.29***  0.14** 
Habit → Intention -0.14*** -0.08+ 
Habit → Reactance  0.03 -0.05 
Fear → Reactance  0.25***  0.04+ 
Neutralization → Reactance  0.49***  0.60*** 
Intention R2 68% 68% 
Model Fit  CFI = 0.98, TLI = 0.96 GoF = 0.56 
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Table 4 provides a comparison of Moody et al.’s (2018) results and this study’s results for each of the tested 
models.  Unless otherwise noted, values in the result columns represent path beta coefficients and statistical 
significance.  For our replication results, + represents significance levels of < 0.10, * represents significance 
levels of <= 0.05, ** represents significance levels of <= 0.01, and *** represents significance levels of <= 
0.001.   As Moody et al. (2018) did not specify the meaning behind the asterisk notation they used, care 
should be taken when comparing statistical significances between the two studies. 
In terms of UMISPC, the explanatory value exhibited in both the original study and the replication was 68%, 
more than two-thirds of the variance detected in both datasets.  However, several key differences existed 
in the original study and the replication study findings.  First, facilitating conditions (β = 0.04) were not found 
to influence the compliance intentions of the graduate student sampled in the original study.  However, 
facilitating conditions were found to strongly influence the compliance intentions of the IT professionals (β 
= 0.48***) sampled in the replication.   
In the Moody et al. study, the reward and costs items loaded onto a single construct and support was not 
found for a relationship (β = 0.13) between that combined construct and compliance intentions.  However, 
in the replication study, the reward and costs items loaded onto two distinct constructs both of which were 
found to be significantly related to the compliance intentions of IT professionals (costs β = 0.13*, reward β 
= 0.28***). Social factors were found to be highly associated with compliance intentions in the graduate 
student sample (β = 0.77**) but not in the IT professional sample (β = -0.04).  Finally, habit and fear were 
found to be strongly associated with the compliance intentions of graduate students. However, both habit 
and fear were only approaching significance in the replication test involving IT professionals.    
In terms of EPMT, the replication model exhibited a slightly lower level of explanatory value (50%) when 
compared to Moody et al. ’s (2018) study (60%).  In addition, the replication results concerning the influence 
of self-efficacy and costs on compliance intentions differed from Moody et al.’s results.  In the original study, 
self-efficacy exhibited a significant negative influence on intention but support for that relationship was not 
found in the replication study.  This may be due in part to the reduced scale that was used in the replication 
study.  Moody et al. reported a 0.896 Cronbach alpha reliability level for their four-item measure of self-
efficacy, while we only achieved a 0.595 Cronbach alpha reliability for our three-item measure.  Finally, in 
the Moody et al. study, costs were not found to be significantly associated with compliance intentions.  
However, in our EPMT replication, a strongly significant association was found between costs and 
compliance intentions.  Interestingly, the costs construct exhibited relatively similar levels of reliability across 
the two studies.   
In terms of TIB, differences between Moody et al. and our replication results were mostly connected to the 
social factors construct.  In Moody et al.’s original study, role was significantly associated with social factors, 
and in-turn social factors were significantly associated with intentions.  In our replication, support for those 
associations was not found.  These differences may be related to our reduced measurement scale for social 
factors.  When validating the replication scales, one of the social factors items was dropped due to a very 
low loading level.  The remaining two items only exhibited a Cronbach alpha reliability level of 0.603. 
Accordingly, the reduced measure may not be able to detect significant associations.  Despite these 
differences, TIB exhibited the best explanatory value (73%), nearly 14 percentage points higher than what 
was detected for the TIB model in the original study.   
In terms of the three models tested in the replication study, the TIB model demonstrated the greatest 
explanatory power with an R2 of 0.73 and the second-best fit with a GoF fit index of 0.59. The EPMT model 
provided the lowest R2 at 0.50 but had the strongest GoF fit index at .62. Finally, the UMISPC model 
provided an R2 of 0.68 and the lowest fit index at .56. 
4 Discussion 
The replication results yielded several interesting insights when compared to Moody et al.’s (2018) results 
as well as when viewed in terms of differences between the models tested within the replication study.  For 
clarity, we begin our discussion in terms of between study results (Moody et al. vs. replication) and end with 
discussion concerning within study results (replication TIB vs. EPMT vs. UMISPC).   
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4.1 Between Study Results 
Our research largely validates the findings from the original Moody et al. (2018) study with a few notable 
differences. For example, we note that TIB had a dramatically higher R2 for policy compliance intention in 
our study (0.73) as compared to the Moody et al. study (0.59).  However, the R2 values for UMISPC policy 
compliance intention were nearly identical at 0.68 in both the original and the replication studies. Given that 
the original study used Finnish students and our study used U.S. IT professionals, these results provide 
support for the notion that UMISPC may be more robust and consistent across dissimilar populations. This 
offers support for generalizing UMISPC since the cultural and work contexts between the studies were quite 
different. We also note that this consistency in results was achieved even after our deliberate efforts to 
create a more parsimonious instrument. After reducing the Moody et al. (2018) instrument to approximately 
half of its original length, it still explained a similar portion of the variance in policy compliance intention. 
Results between the two studies also yield interesting differences when comparing fit statistics and 
significant pathways. The CLI and TLI fit statistics for UMISPC were greater in the original study than all 
other models while in the replication EPMT exhibited the best GoF fit statistic. Moody et al. (2018) expressed 
concern about fit statistics when only the Theory of Reasoned Action yielded optimal fit statistics and that 
for most theories “…the fully saturated models had a better fit than the theoretical models, implying that 
omitted relationships between the theoretical constructs were reducing the fit of the data to the model.”  
These results indicate that further research is probably needed to identify and update UMISPC to account 
for missing or under-represented constructs.     
In terms of path coefficients, we found several interesting differences in the influence that the UMISPC 
predictors have on the compliance intentions of graduate students and IT professionals.  Specifically, in the 
original study involving graduate students, social factors, habit, and fear were all found to be strongly related 
to compliance intentions.  However, no association was found between social factors and the compliance 
intentions of IT professionals while both habit and fear were only weakly (between 0.10 and 0.05) associated 
with the policy compliance intentions of IT professionals.  Additionally, facilitating conditions, costs, and 
rewards were not found to be significantly associated with the compliance intentions of the graduate 
students but were found to be strongly associated with the compliance intentions of the IT professionals.  
These findings support the notion that IT professionals evaluate information security compliance decisions 
differently than graduate students and also provide support the use of UMISPC as a robust tool to assess 
compliance intentions across audiences.  Further, these finding provide support for use of the full UMISPC 
model rather than Moody et al. suggested reduced model in which facilitating conditions, costs, and rewards 
were removed due to non-significant associations with intentions.    
Our replication also provides support for the impact of fear and neutralization on reactance. We achieved a 
somewhat higher predictability for reactance with an R2 of .41 as compared to the R2 of .295 in the original 
Moody et al. (2018) study. This result is not comparable to TIB or EPMT due to differences in the models, 
but UMISPC’s ability to predict a smaller percentage of reactance as compared to policy compliance 
intention in both studies points toward consistency across varied populations. 
While our replication provides support for the general premise of UMISPC’s combined policy compliance 
predictive model, much work remains to be done regarding refinement of the individual scales used to 
measure the model's constructs. We particularly note our issues with the shortened habit scale, where the 
retained items failed to load on a single factor during factor analysis. We believe this was partially caused 
by a restricted response range where most respondents answered “strongly agree” for each of the three 
items on the scale. We also suspect that wording of the habit items could be problematic in that phrases 
like “normally”, “without thinking” and “automatically” may have different meanings for different respondents. 
Thus, we advocate for additional work to identify and validate new scale items for measuring the habit 
construct. We strongly believe that the twelve-item habit scale from (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003) that was 
adopted by Moody et al. (2018) is unnecessarily lengthy and can be revised to accurately assess the effects 
of habit in a more parsimonious form.   
4.2 Within Study Results 
When comparing the results of the three models included in our replication study, the strength of the TIB 
model cannot be understated.  While both UMISPC and TIB explained over two thirds of the variance in the 
behavioral intentions of IT professionals to comply with security policies, TIB exhibited greater explanatory 
value than UMISPC in the replication (0.73 vs. 0.68).  TIB achieved that level of explanatory value even 
though reconciliation of the constructs between the models yielded only 10 constructs for TIB compared to 
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13 constructs for UMISPC. Nine of the 10 pathways were significant for TIB when compared to 7 of 13 for 
the UMISPC.   We also note that in the replication TIB had a higher R2 for policy compliance intention when 
as compared to the EPMT model (0.50).  These findings indicate that further work is needed to understand 
the TIB factors that better represented IT professionals’ compliance intention decisions in order to 
incorporate and/or better represent those factors in a generalizable UMISPC model.    
5 Limitations 
The first limitation noted is the use of IT professionals as subjects. We chose that population as we believed 
that the compliance intentions of IT professionals might be different than those of general employees.  IT 
professionals often have more knowledge regarding systems and security threats, which may lead them to 
feel better equipped to make security policy compliance choices.  Accordingly, their perceptions of threats 
may be different from that of general employees, which could in-turn affect their compliance intentions. 
Thus, we viewed our sample selection as a potential limitation. 
Second, while Moody et al (2018) called for additional constructs and moderators in different contexts, we 
chose to attempt a reduction of the instrument given its length and did not attempt to make use of additional 
constructs or relationships. Our item selection may have influenced the results and thus, we viewed this as 
a limitation. 
A final limitation deals with our selection of Harman’s single factor test for common method variance. 
Recently it has been suggested that this test is insensitive and incomplete, possibly contributing another 
potential limitation to our study.  
6 Conclusion 
This study furthers the aims of the original Moody et al. (2018) study in several important ways. First, it tests 
the notions of the model in a different context and with a more parsimonious instrument and it shows that 
the predictive power of the model is similar even under varied context. Second, our study helps to define 
the boundaries of UMISPC’s applicability and situations where the model has weaknesses. Our findings 
related to the habit scale are one example of an area where additional work is necessary to develop a 
robust, parsimonious scale to measure the habit construct. Third, our research demonstrates the importance 
of retaining the constructs that were not significant predictors of policy compliance intention in the original 
Moody et al. (2018) study as these became important predictors when the model was applied to a different 
population. Overall, our replication indicates that UMISPC is robust model for assessing policy compliance 
intention in its current state but offers substantial opportunities for refinement. 
  
16 A Conceptual Replication of the Unified Model of Information Security Policy Compliance 
 
Volume 6  Paper 7 
 
7 References 
Benitez, J., Henseler, J., Castillo, A., & Schuberth, F. (2019). How to perform and report an impactful 
analysis using partial least squares: Guidelines for confirmatory and explanatory IS research. 
Information & Management, 57(2), 103168. 
Bulgurcu, B., Cavusoglu, H., & Benbasat, I. (2010). Information Security Policy Compliance: An Empirical 
Study of Rationality-based Beliefs and Information Security Awareness. MIS Quarterly, 34(3), 
523–548. 
Chin, W. W. (1998). The partial least squares approach to structural equation modeling. Modern Methods 
for Business Research, 295(2), 295–336. 
Clore, G. L., & Schnall, S. (2005). The influence of affect on attitude. In D. Albarracín, B. T. Johnson, & M. 
P., Zanna (Eds.), Handbook of Attitudes (pp. 437-489). Mahwah: Erlbaum. 
Gefen, D., Rigdon, E. E., & Straub, D. (2011). An update and extension to SEM guidelines for 
administrative and social sciences research. MIS Quarterly, 35(2), iii–xiv. 
Harman, D. (1976). A single factor test of common method variance. Journal of Psychology, 35, 359–379. 
Herath, T., & Rao, H. R. (2009). Protection motivation and deterrence: A framework for security policy 
compliance in organisations. European Journal of Information Systems, 18(2), 106–125. 
McIntosh, C. N., Edwards, J. R., & Antonakis, J. (2014). Reflections on partial least squares path 
modeling. Organizational Research Methods, 17(2), 210–251. 
Moody, G. D., Siponen, M., & Pahnila, S. (2018). Toward a unified model of information security policy 
compliance. MIS Quarterly, 42(1), 285-311. 
Peters, E., Slovic, P., Hibbard, J. H., & Tusler, M. (2006). Why worry? Worry, risk perceptions, and 
willingness to act to reduce medical errors. Health Psychology, 25(2), 144-152. 
Ponemon. (2014). Fourth Annual Benchmark Study on Patient Privacy & Data Security. Ponemon Institute 
LLC. Retrieved from: http://www.ponemon.org/library/archives/2014/03.   
Posey, C., Roberts, T. L., Lowry, P. B., & Hightower, R. T. (2014). Bridging the divide: A qualitative 
comparison of information security thought patterns between information security professionals 
and ordinary organizational insiders. Information & Management, 51(5), 551–567. 
Schneier, B. (2011). Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World. John Wiley & Sons. 
Siponen, M., & Baskerville, R. L. (2018). Intervention effect rates as a path to research relevance: 
Information systems security example. Journal of the Association for Information Systems, 19(4), 
247-265. 
Tehseen, S., Ramayah, T., & Sajilan, S. (2017). Testing and controlling for common method variance: A 
review of available methods. Journal of Management Sciences, 4(2), 142–168. 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2015, December 17). Computer and Information Technology 
Occupations. Occupational Outlook Handbook. Retrieved from: http://www.bls.gov/ooh/computer-
and-information-technology/home.htm. 
Verplanken, B., & Orbell, S. (2003). Reflections on past behavior: A self‐report index of habit strength. 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 33(6), 1313–1330. 
Vinzi, V. E., Trinchera, L., & Amato, S. (2010). PLS path modeling: From foundations to recent 
developments and open issues for model assessment and improvement. In Handbook of partial 
least squares (pp. 47–82). Springer. 
 
  
AIS Transactions on Replication Research 17 
  
Volume 6  Paper 7 
 
8 Appendix A – Instrument Scenarios 
8.1.1  
8.1.2 Scenario 1 - USB Drive 
Chris is a mid-level manager in a medium-sized company where he has worked for several years.  Chris is 
working on an important report that requires analysis of the company’s customer database, which contains 
sensitive financial and purchase history information.  Chris is leaving on a business trip and is scheduled to 
return the day the report is due.  Because of the sensitive nature of corporate data, the company has a strict 
policy that prohibits copying data to USB drives.  Chris feels that copying the data to a USB and analyzing 
it while on the road will save time, money, and ensure the report is submitted on time. Accordingly, Chris 
copies the data to a USB.     
8.1.3 Scenario 2 – Workstation Logout 
Chris is a mid-level manager at a medium-sized company where he has worked in the inventory 
procurement department for several years. The company uses software that allows authorized employees 
to make inventory purchases.  The company has a strict policy that employees must log off or lock 
workstations when not in use.  However, Chris’s department is very short staffed and the log on process for 
the procurement software is long, tedious, and slow.  Chris feels that keeping his workstation logged-on and 
unlocked throughout the day saves time and allows him to work more efficiently.  Accordingly, Chris leaves 
his workstation logged on and unlocked throughout the workday. 
8.1.4 Scenario3 – Password Sharing 
Chris is a mid-level manager at a medium company where he has worked for several years.  The company 
has a strong policy that workstations must be password protected and that passwords must not be shared. 
However, Chris is on a business trip and a co-worker needs a file that is stored on Chris’s workstation in 
order to complete an important report that is due today.  Chris feels that sharing his password in instances 
like this one saves time and effort.  Accordingly, he gives the coworker the password.  
  
18 A Conceptual Replication of the Unified Model of Information Security Policy Compliance 
 
Volume 6  Paper 7 
 
9 Appendix B - Instrument Measures 
Unless otherwise noted, all items were measured on a standard seven-point Likert scale, anchored at one 
with strongly disagree and at seven with strongly agree.   
Construct Moody et al. 
Item ID 
Moody et al. Item Text Our Item Text Our Item Num 
Intention Intent1 What is the chance you 
would do what Mattila did in 
the described scenario? 
I would likely do what Chris 
did in the described scenario. 
Intention1 
 
 Intent2 I would act in the same way 
as Mattila did if I were in the 
same situation. 
In a similar situation, I would 
respond like Chris. 
Intention2 
 
Severity Sever1 An information security 
breach in my organization 
would be a serious problem 
for me. 
An information security event 
resulting from my behavior 
could cause serious 
problems. 
Severity3 
 
 Sever2 An information security 
breach in my organization 
would be a serious problem 
for my organization. 
An information security 
incident could have a critical 
effect on my company. 
Severity2 
 Sever3 If I were to do what Mattila 
did, there would be a 
serious information 
security problem for my 
organization. 
Causing an information 
security incident could have 
severe consequences. 
Severity1 
 
Susceptibility Vulner1 I would be subjected to an 
information security threat 
if I were to do what Mattila 
did. 
The probability of security 
incidents occurring is 
heightened when people 
don't follow security policies. 
Susceptibility2 
 
 Vulner2 My organization would be 
subjected to an information 
security threat if I were to 
do what Mattila did. 
Not following information 
security policies is likely to 
result in a security event. 
Susceptibility3 
 
 Vulner3 An information security 
problem would occur if I 
were to do what Mattila did. 
A security incident would 
likely occur if I were to do 
what Chris did. 
Susceptibility1 
 
Response 
Efficacy 
RespEff2 If I were to comply with 
information security 
procedures, IS security 
breaches would be scarce. 
Complying with information 
security policies really helps 
the company avoid security 
incidents. 
Resp_Efficacy1 
 
 RespEff3 If I were to do the opposite 
to what Mattila did, it would 
keep IS security breaches 
down. 
Not behaving like Chris 
keeps security breaches to a 
minimum. 
Resp_Efficacy3 
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Construct Moody et al. 
Item ID 
Moody et al. Item Text Our Item Text Our Item Num 
 RespEff4 If I were to do the opposite 
to what Mattila did, IS 
security breaches would be 
minimal. 
Doing the opposite of Chris 
helps keep security events 
from happening. 
Resp_Efficacy2 
 
Self-Efficacy SelfEffi2 I can use information 
security measures if 
someone tells me what to 
do as I go along. 
I can abide by my company's 
security policies if 
instructions are provided for 
dealing with situations like 
the one described. 
Self_Efficacy1 
 
 SelfEffi3 Doing the opposite of what 
Mattila did would be difficult 
for me to do. 
In a similar situation, it would 
be easy for me find a solution 
to the situation that fits within 
the boundaries of the security 
policy. 
Self_Efficacy2 
 
 SelfEffi4 Doing the opposite of what 
Mattila did would be easy 
for me to do. 
In a similar situation, I would 
be able to figure out a way to 
abide by the policy. 
Self_Efficacy3 
 
Response 
Cost 
Responceco
st1 
Complying with information 
security procedures would 
be time consuming. 
In Chris's situation, 
complying with the policy 
would be time consuming. 
Resp_Cost1 
 
 Responceco
st2 
Complying with information 
security procedures would 
take work time. 
Following the security policy 
in the given scenario would 
take additional work time. 
Resp_Cost2 
 
 Responceco
st4 
Complying with information 
security procedures makes 
my work more difficult. 
Following security policies 
sometimes makes work more 
difficult. 
Resp_Cost3 
 
Rewards Rewards/ 
Costs1 
If I were to do what Mattila 
did, I would save time. 
If I were to do what Chris did, 
it would save time. 
Rewards1 
 
 Rewards/ 
Costs2 
If I were to do what Mattila 
did, I would save work time. 
Responding like Chris would 
save work time. 
Rewards2 
 
 Rewards/ 
Costs3 
Not complying with 
information security 
procedures saves work 
time. 
In the given situation, not 
complying with the policy 
saved time. 
Rewards3 
Habit Habit1 Complying with information 
security procedures is 
something I do frequently 
I normally comply with 
information security policies. 
 
Habit1 
 
 Habit10 Complying with information 
security procedures is 
something I have no need 
to think about doing. 
Complying with security 
policies is something I do 
without thinking. 
Habit2 
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Construct Moody et al. 
Item ID 
Moody et al. Item Text Our Item Text Our Item Num 
 
 Habit11 Complying with information 
security procedures is 
something that’s typically 
“me.” 
Complying with security 
policies is something I do 
automatically. 
Habit3 
 
Attitude 
(semantic 
differential 
scale) 
Atti2 If I were to do what Mattila 
did it would be a very: 
foolish idea – wise idea 
In a similar situation, doing 
what Chris did would be a 
very wise/foolish idea 
 
Attitude1 
 
 Atti3 If I were to do what Mattila 
did it would be a very: 
unpleasant idea – pleasant 
idea 
In a similar situation, doing 
what Chris did would be a 
very good/bad idea 
Attitude2 
 
 Atti4 If I were to do what Mattila 
did it would be a very: 
negative idea – positive 
idea 
In a similar situation, doing 
what Chris did would be a 
very: negative idea – positive 
idea 
Attitutde3 
 
Subjective 
Norms 
Subnorm1 I believe that top 
management in my 
organization thinks I should 
do what Mattila did. 
I believe top management in 
my company thinks that I 
should do what Chris did. 
Subject_Norm1 
 
 Subnorm2 I believe that my immediate 
supervisor in my 
organization thinks I should 
do what Mattila did. 
My immediate supervisor 
thinks I should respond like 
Chris. 
Subject_Norm2 
 
 Subnorm3 I believe that coworkers in 
my organization think I 
should do what Mattila did. 
My coworkers think that I 
should respond like Chris. 
 
Subject_Norm3 
 
Facilitating 
Conditions 
FacCon2 I have enough knowledge 
to follow information 
security procedures. 
I have enough knowledge to 
follow information security 
procedures. 
Fac_Cond1 
 
 FacCon3 I need more guidance from 
my superiors with work-
related information security 
policies. 
I need more guidance from 
my superiors regarding 
information security policies 
at my company. 
Fac_Cond2 
 
 FacCon4 I need more guidance from 
the IT/information security 
personnel regarding 
information security issues 
related to my work 
I need more guidance from IT 
regarding security policy 
issues related to my work. 
 
Fac_Cond3 
 
Affect Affect1 What Mattila did is smart. What Chris did is smart/dumb Affect1 
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Item ID 
Moody et al. Item Text Our Item Text Our Item Num 
 
 Affect3 What Mattila did is 
enjoyable. 
What Chris did makes 
sense/is senseless 
Affect2 
 
 Affect4 What Mattila did is 
pleasant. 
What Chris did is reasonable/ 
is unreasonable 
Affect3 
 
Roles Roles1 What Mattila did is 
compatible with his/her 
work. 
What Chris did is compatible 
with his/her work.   
Roles1 
 Roles2 What Mattila did fits with 
his/her work style. 
What Chris did is fits his/her 
job. 
Roles2 
 Roles3 What Mattila did can be 
justified due to the nature 
of Mattila’s work. 
Chris’s choice can be 
justified due to the nature of 
his/her job.   
Roles3 
Self-Concept SelfCon1 I would feel guilty if I did 
what Mattila did. 
I would feel guilty if I did what 
Chris did. 
Self_Con1 
 
 SelfCon2 What Mattila did is 
consistent with my 
principles. 
What Chris did is not 
consistent with my principles. 
Self_Con2 
 
 SelfCon3 It is acceptable to do what 
Mattila did. 
It is not acceptable to do what 
Chris did. 
Self_Con3 
 
Social Factors SocialFact1 With respect to complying 
with information security 
procedures, I have to do as 
the top management of my 
organization thinks 
In my company, information 
security policy compliance is 
important. 
Social_Fact1 
 
 SocialFact2 With respect to complying 
with information security 
procedures, I have to do as 
my colleagues think. 
My coworkers frown on those 
who do not follow the 
company's information 
security policies. 
Social_Fact2 
 
 SocialFact3 With respect to complying 
with information security 
procedures, I have to do as 
my superiors think. 
People in my company are 
diligent about complying with 
information security policies. 
Social_Fact3 
 
Punishment Formalcert2 I would receive corporate 
sanctions if I violated 
company information 
security procedures. 
If management learned I had 
violated an information 
security policy, I would be 
punished. 
Punishment1 
 
 Formalsev2 I would receive severe 
corporate sanctions if I 
The sanctions would be 
severe if it were known that 
Punishment2 
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Construct Moody et al. 
Item ID 
Moody et al. Item Text Our Item Text Our Item Num 
violated company information 
security procedures. 
I violated an information 
security policy. 
 
 Formalcert3 What is the chance that 
you would be warned if 
management learned you 
had violated company 
information security 
procedures? 
I would be in trouble if 
management learned I had 
violated an information 
security policy. 
Punishment3 
 
Fear Fear7 My computer might be 
compromised if I did what 
Mattila did. 
Computers might be 
compromised if I did what 
Chris did. 
Fear1 
 Fear10 My computer might 
become unusable if I did 
what Mattila did. 
Company systems might 
become unusable if I did 
what Chris did. 
Fear2 
 Fear11 
 
My computer might 
become slower if I did what 
Mattila did. 
Company computers might 
become slower if I did what 
Chris did. 
Fear3 
Neutralization Neutcond3 It is not as wrong to violate 
company information 
security procedures that 
are too restrictive. 
It is not wrong to violate 
security policies that are too 
restrictive. 
 
Neutralizaiton1 
 
 Neutloyal1 It is alright to violate 
company information 
security procedures to get 
a job done. 
It is alright to ignore a security 
policy to get a job done. 
Neutralization2 
 
 Neutinjury3 It is OK to violate company 
information security 
procedures if no one gets 
hurt. 
It is OK to violate a security 
policy as long as no one gets 
hurt. 
Neutralization3 
 
Reactance React4 To what degree do you feel 
that problems resulting 
from acting like Mattila did 
are overly exaggerated? 
To what degree do you feel 
that problems resulting from 
doing things like Chris did are 
exaggerated/downplayed? 
Reactance1 
 
 React3 To what degree do you 
think that problems 
resulting from acting like 
Mattila did are overstated? 
To what degree do you feel 
that problems resulting from 
doing things like Chris did are 
overstated/understated? 
Reactance2 
 
   To what degree do you feel 
that problems resulting from 
doing things like Chris did are 
a fake problem/a real 
problem? 
Reactance3 
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